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Technology and the Environment: An Overview 
DOMINIQUE FORAY AND ARNULF GRUBLER 
ABSTRACT 
The article starts with a brief history of the debate on the interactions between technology and the environ-
ment. A short overview of each article of this special issue is then presented . Three cross-cutting "metathemes" 
emerge from the articles. The first deals with the characteristics of uncertainty, ignorance, and dispersed knowledge 
that have historically characterized the generation and distribution of environmental and technological knowl-
edge. The second addresses the issue of possible tensions that exist between the forces of technological inertia 
and the forces of environmentally induced technological change . Finally, some policy dilemmas between short-
and long-term environmental preservation and technological change objectives are discussed. 
Technology and Environment: a Brief History of Debate 
In the early 1970s, a cluster of articles by Herbert Simon, Nathan Rosenberg, Vernon 
Ruttan, Chauncey Starr, and Richard Rudman [1-4] developed the same message (albeit 
through different lines of arguments): namely, that relevant and viable solutions to envi-
ronmental problems call for more, and better mastery of, technology not less- To be 
precise, more "technology" would not necessarily mean more of today's technology or 
simple more technological "hardware," but would especially mean a deeper understanding 
of the mechanisms underlying technological change and the factors governing the diffusion 
of environmentally relevant technologies, as well as increased knowledge of the policy 
and institutional context that could promote or hamper required changes. 
This message, which preceded or was in immediate response to the global modeling 
work of Forrester [5] and Meadows et al. [6], went largely unnoticed. The recurrent 
"anti-Malthusian" critique of models and world views of the "Limits to Growth" type 
by Simon and Kahn [7] and a group of Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) scientists 
[8], also did not change the situation. The dominant "world view" considered technology 
inherently static; its extrapolation into the distant future inevitably led to resource deple-
tion and environmental toxification. The newly emerging environmental movement also 
considered technology a major source of environmental degradation that would continue 
to generate unintended and unwanted side effects. At the same time, policy actions to 
address initial environmental issues most notably local air and water pollution, through 
legislation and regulation also relied on the dominant mode of thinking about technology 
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and technological change . Environmental policies were largely directed toward forced 
diffusion of a host of incremental, "end-of-pipe" clean-up technologies. Technology re-
mained a major "culprit" of environmental problems and was not seen as a possible answer 
to overcoming anticipated resource limits of either a physical or an environmental nature. 
A certain change of perception and a rediscovery of the potential role of technology 
occurred late in the 1980s [9]. At that time, a more differentiated view of technology 
emerged. The "paradox of technological development" [10] describes technology as of 
a dual nature with respect to the environment: Technology has had an unprecedented 
impact on the environment, primarily through productivity increases that enabled sub-
stantial expansion of output (and consumption). Simultaneously, however, technological 
changes have also enhanced technological and economic capacities for remedies. Positive 
environmental influences of technology derive from three mechanisms: (1) at each mo-
ment, processes of technological substitution increase the efficiency of production modes 
and the usage of goods and services, providing new possibilities of overcoming limitations, 
e.g., of resource scarcity and depletion (the "age of substitutability" in the sense of Goeller 
and Weinberg [l l]), or of overcoming limitations imposed by the absorptive capacity of 
the environment; (2) some technologies, such as satellite technologies, that do not enter 
any substitution process (they do not directly replace any old technology), can be qualified 
as "natural resource augmenting," e.g., enabling the discovery of new hydrocarbon or 
water reservoirs; and (3) technological change, or rather changes in a host of interrelated 
technologies, could (at least in principle) offer reductions in the resource, materials, and 
environmental intensiveness of industrial societies that are not only marginal, but rather 
are by orders of magnitude. This technological potential emerged from studies that charted 
long-term trends in materials and energy use ("dematerialization") that clearly illustrated 
orders-of-magnitude improvements since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and 
identified similar orders-of-magnitude potentials for future improvements as well [12-15]. 
More than 20 years after the so-called "oil crises," there has also been a change in 
perception of the notion of absolute physical resource limits: the new view is that our 
definition of natural resources cannot be reduced to "simple" geological or mineral issues. 
Natural resource abundance is endogenous, technologically, economically, and socially 
constructed [16], and does not appear simply geologically predetermined. 
Studies [14, 17] have also shown that technological change can be neither reduced 
to singular, discrete time events nor reduced to a limited number of "key" technologies. 
In particular, researchers that tried to determine why long-term economic growth is not 
a smooth continuous process quickly identified technology as something much more 
encompassing, ultimately consisting of whole clusters of interrelated technological, orga-
nizational, and institutional settings forming particular technoeconomic "paradigms" (in 
the sense of Freeman and Perez [17]. The environment was subsequently identified as 
being a possible decisive candidate in the reconfiguration of the entire technological 
landscape, or in the emergence of a "green" technoeconomic paradigm. 
With such a notion, the problematique of technological change to solve environmen-
tal problems is becoming broader: transitions to cleaner technologies must not be limited 
to the energy and natural resource sectors. Because the problem at stake ultimately is a 
problem of changing social behaviors, consumption patterns, and lifestyles, technology 
must be considered holistically. Conversely, new technologies (such as information and 
communication technologies) could have a potentially large influence on, say, commuting 
and transportation, and thus possibly contribute to solutions. Nevertheless, it is fair to 
say that, in view of the multitude of environmental issues at stake and given that more 
than two-thirds of global population are still aspiring to the kind of resource- and environ-
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mental-intensive lifestyles of the affluent industrialized countries, a shift to an entire new 
technoeconomic "paradigm" seems required. 
Whereas there has been progress in both conceptual ideas and empirical data charting 
long-term technology dynamics, progress in modeling has been far slower, if not disap-
pointing. In essence the treatment of technology, technological change, and resources 
has not improved noticeably since the first generation of global models. Technology 
has largely remained exogenous, either falling like manna from heaven (in the form of 
"backstop" technologies saving the models from infeasibilities) or reduced to autonomous 
trend parameters that are hardly meaningful for policy. Resources, too, have remained 
largely exogenous, and fixed to a priori point estimates that reflect geological appraisals 
of reserves, but which most geologists, in turn, would refuse to consider as long-term 
resource potentials in view of persistent knowledge gaps and recurrent estimation blunders 
in the past. It is perhaps not surprising that the long-term future of both technology and 
the environment described by many global models and scenarios has not changed since 
the early 1970s. Forecasted "doomsdays" and short-term policy recommendations of such 
models and the "world view" they represent seem not to have changed much either [18]. 
Last but not least, during the 1994 and 1995 summer sessions of the "Technology 
and Environment" research network established at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) that led to this special issue, attention focused on a third role 
of technology: technology as a research tool-that is, as an instrument of (microscopic 
and macroscopic) observation, providing knowledge about the nature of environmental 
problems and about the effectiveness and efficiency of proposed or implemented solutions.' 
Such a new view of technology, both as an instrument to reveal the nature and the 
extent of undesirable (environmental) side effects of technologies and as a possible solution 
to alleviate them through both incremental and radical change, suggests a new rationale 
for policy. It is no longer a matter of slowing down technological changes in the wake of 
uncertainty or anticipated environmental threats, by implementing regulatory standards, 
adding "end-of-pipe" technologies, and punishing innovators (see [19]). The problem is 
rather to accelerate and to increase the speed of diffusion of technologies that could 
become socially beneficial for diagnostic (e.g., environmental monitoring), explicative 
(environmental simulations), and "curative" measures; to increase the availability of op-
tions; to search for alternative solutions; and to create sufficient "escape velocity" from 
current entrenchments in undesirable technologies and practices. 
Such a new policy rationale is, however, complex. The goal of environmentally 
sustainable development is a "moving target" and requires a wide range of complementary 
policies: on one hand, policies to support the generation of long-term technological alter-
natives and, on the other hand, policies to control environmental pollution in the short-
term. A new organizational strategy seems necessary that enables both incremental (adap-
tationist) technological change (which can increase technological irreversibilities and 
"lock-in" phenomena) and the search for radical technological (and organizational) alter-
natives. The third potential role of technology-as an instrument to better understand 
our interactions with the environment and eventually to replace inadvertent "experiments" 
by simulation-is becoming critical. For instance, the ability to replace real experimenta-
tions by simulation in the field of nuclear weapons or to accelerate technological research 
by increasing the use of simulation to the detriment of prototype development (e.g., as 
1 We are indebted to Marc Willinger (BETA, Louis Pasteur University, Strasbourg, France) for drawing 
our attention to this issue at the T&E Workshop, International Institute for Applied Analysis, Laxenburg, 
Austria, July 8-9, 1994. 
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done for the Boeing 777) indicates the possible emergence of a new mode of knowledge 
generation. (See Note Added in Proof at end of text.) 
A Short Overview of the Articles in This Special Issue 
This special issue on "Technology and Environment" includes eight articles. In this 
additional Introduction, we briefly present the main arguments developed in each article. 
The order of presentation follows the sequence of the articles as they appear in this issue 
and thus expresses a certain evolution of arguments and viewpoints. At the end of this 
Introduction, we present other interpretative "keys" for reading this special issue. 
The model of "unanticipated discovery," elaborated by Thomas Schelling in the first 
article, can be viewed both as a revealing case study about a particular research pattern 
in the domain of nuclear weapons and as a metaphor of a more general process of 
disclosure of uncertainty and ignorance in the field of the interactions between technology 
and environment: the invention, diffusion, and use of technologies lead to a sequence 
of "discoveries by accident," which subsequently, and surprisingly, reveal properties, 
characteristics, and environmental impacts of technologies. 
The article by Harvey Brooks complements the first one. It addresses the problem 
of attention management: it is not enough to generate knowledge about environmental 
impacts of technologies. That knowledge must be distributed to the right experts and 
policy-makers, that is to say persons with the capacity to take or to resist actions. (Schelling 
also discusses an attention management problem in his sketch of the development of 
energy studies and the greenhouse issue.) Such an "attention management" problem repre-
sents a clear departure from simplistic conceptions that "more information is better" and 
requires new modes for the integration of information from a much wider range of 
sources and networks of expertise than is available today. 
Christopher Freeman, the author of the third article, closes this first sequence of 
articles by discussing the problematique of technology and environment interactions as 
cast within the framework of "world models." Reconciling environment with other social 
and economic objectives entails both regulation, economic incentives, institutions, and 
finally technological innovations. The article demonstrates the need for a new model of 
innovation to support the move to a more sustainable pattern of growth. Freeman's article 
also introduces the second cluster of contributions to this special issue, by addressing 
the question of which conditions are necessary for realizing (some of) the potentials 
offered by continuous technological change. 
These conditions are reviewed at the theoretical level by Vernon Ruttan in the fourth 
article. He reviews two models of technical change: path dependence, in which the forces 
of technological inertia are predominant, and induced innovation, where new factors 
and criteria have the potential to redirect technological trajectories toward new social 
objectives. The article concludes that the two models are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive, and technological inertia can be overcome to induce a path of techno-
logical development and infrastructure investments consistent with the rising (social and 
economic) value of environmental resources . 
These complementarities, and the fact that forces of change can overcome technologi-
cal inertia (or reinforce it), are illustrated in the following two articles. 
For Robin Cowan and Staffan Hulten, technological inertia derives from intraindus-
try and interindustry sources . The article explores possibilities of escaping from technolog-
ical "lock-in," a term coined by Brian Arthur [20, 21] . The authors use the example of 
the electric vehicle to review the potential for change of various "inducing factors," 
including the emergence of environmental priorities. Vigorous policy support in all possi-
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ble domains would be necessary to provide the quantum leap from the current entrench-
ment in the internal-combustion automobile to the electric car. 
Jean-Marie Martin, author of the sixth article, explores the driving forces of the 
evolution of energy-related technologies . The article reminds us that technological change 
rarely takes the direction anticipated by the proponents of new technologies and that 
technology evolution must be considered holistically. Improvements in both new and 
established technologies, along with the institutional environment in which technological 
change is embedded, need to be considered. Factors of inertia, such as technolog-
ical interrelatedness, lumpiness of investments, and factors of change, including techno-
logical variety, pluralism, and institutional factors, are assessed in their respective contri-
bution to the evolutionary dynamics of energy technologies, and a rationale for policy 
oriented toward radical change is given. The article, however, reconfirms that structural 
change in energy systems is a slow process that must be kept in mind especially for 
(environmental) advocates of a rapid move "away from the carbon atom." 
The article by Arnulf Griibler and Nebosja Nakicenovic provides a contrasting long-
term perspective on the "decarbonization" of the global energy system. The long-term 
stable patterns of structural change proceed, however, at slow rates, confirming the analy-
sis of Jean-Marie Martin that earlier expectations of a rapid transition away from a 
carbon-based economy were perhaps premature. Nevertheless , the gradual (although 
slow) decarbonization trend emerges as an undeniable consequence of continued techno-
logical change and changing consumer preferences for more flexible, convenient, and 
clean energy forms as incomes rise. The article give reasons for cautious optimism, as 
this development requires "only" a significant acceleration of decarbonization; it does 
not require a complete departure into an entirely new development paradigm. 
Iddo Wernick explores the history and future of the evolution of U.S. material 
consumption patterns. Wernick identifies a number of indicators that show a slow and 
gradual "dematerialization" of the U.S. economy. Bulk materials consumption no longer 
runs in tandem with economic activity in the United States . In spite of a general persistence 
of main factors driving patterns of materials consumption (including demographic vari-
ables and consumer preferences), some factors of change, such as saturated markets and 
technological innovations, offer promise for reduction in the material and environmental 
intensiveness of economic activities . 
Technology and Environment: Three Major Cross-Cutting Themes 
In this section, we present our own interpretative summary of the main issues ad-
dressed in the articles of this special issue. The articles run across three lines of argument. 
Uncertainty, ignorance, and "dispersed knowledge" are described as a dominant 
mode of generation and distribution of technological knowledge; this is particularly true 
for environmental knowledge and problem awareness . An important question addressed 
in this issue is whether science and policy are moving from a system characterized by 
unexpected discoveries and (environmental) "surprises" and limits of management atten-
tion (policy-making can only deal with a limited number of issues at a time) to a system 
characterized by a more rational and systematic mode of knowledge acquisition and distri-
bution. 
The second question addressed in the articles deals with the tensions between the 
forces of technological stability and inertia (associated with increasing returns, lock-in 
effects, and the features of path dependence of large technological systems) and the forces 
of change, including the role of environment as a possible factor inducing the direction 
of technological change. 
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Finally, the articles point to new policy challenges that are emerging. In a nutshell, 
technology policy must increasingly integrate Jong-term knowledge acquisition and envi-
ronmental monitoring, and increasingly feature both mission-oriented objectives (focus 
on long-term development objectives rather than short-term technology selection) and 
diffusion-oriented objectives (focus on contextual factors and incentives that steer technol-
ogy diffusion). 
UNCERTAINTY, IGNORANCE, AND DISPERSED KNOWLEDGE 
Using the example of nuclear weapons, Schelling shows that unexpected discoveries 
and research by accident represent a frequently forgotten but important process of learn-
ing in a domain where uncertainty and ignorance predominate. Environmental issues are 
a particularly obvious case. Besides the inevitable factor of limited knowledge, there is 
an additional factor at work: a systematic bias in the evaluation and information-gathering 
processes of new technologies that are always assessed according to the characteristics 
and properties of existing technologies. Environmental issues provide many examples of 
"discovery by accident": from the impacts of biotic accumulation of DDT to the discovery 
of an Antarctic "ozone hole" (this latter discovery, in fact, was only made possible by 
advances in knowledge of stratospheric chemistry and new technologies of measurement 
and remote satellite sensing). 
As a new technology emerges, uncertainties must be dealt with; these uncertainties 
include not only the technology itself (its current and future properties) but also its possible 
impacts. These can be classified into three categories: uncertainties of impacts associated 
with individual uses of the technology; uncertainties associated with the modes of social 
usage; and uncertainties associated with the (ultimate) magnitude of technology diffusion 
and thus with (potential) cumulative effects or impacts. For example, when automobiles 
and railways were first introduced there were concerns over the following questions: what 
will the health impacts be on railway users (we tend to forget that a number of 19th 
century medical studies were concerned about the possible health impacts of "excessive" 
railway speeds of 20 miles per hour)? Will the car remain a curiosity for the rich or 
gain any social importance, perhaps ultimately replacing all riding horses? Beyond what 
car-density level might environmental problems such as metropolitan smog emerge? Will 
the environmental impacts be worse than those of the dominant technology of the day 
(i.e., horse manure [22])? Uncertainty also pervades the scientific understanding of the 
mechanisms linking the modes of usage of technologies to environmental problems. Con-
tinuing with the automobile example, are environmental impacts proportional to the 
number of cars on the road? (based on [23] they are not); which types of pollution could 
emerge that are not known or anticipated at the moment of the introduction of the 
automobile? Thus, much knowledge must be acquired on a new technology itself, on its 
possible modes and extent of individual and social use, (environmental) side effects, and 
so on. 
As knowledge and information are progressively acquired, another central problem 
emerges, that of access to knowledge or what Harvey Brooks describes as the "attention 
management problem." There is simply a difference between knowledge that may exist 
somewhere and knowledge that is available in the right form, at the right time, to the right 
people. Perhaps the greenhouse debate best illustrates such an "attention management 
problem" as the basic science (as well as order of magnitude forecasts of possible global 
warming resulting from elevated concentrations of C02) has been known, in principle, 
for exactly 100 years-Svente Arrenhius's classic study [24] appeared in April 1896-
and the basic numerical global forecasts have not changed much even with the advent 
of supercomputers and large general circulation models. 
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Therefore a central issue relates to the "dispersion" of environmentally and socially 
relevant knowledge. It remains to be determined whether the attention management prob-
lem can be gradually reduced by new technologies of electronic networks, information 
distribution, or artificial intelligence. 
In a more general sense, the first line of arguments encountered in the articles of 
this special issue is whether we can move from an old pattern of knowledge generation 
and distribution (the pattern associated with research by accident, ignorance about ulti-
mate uses and diffusion of technologies, and their impacts) and the attention management 
problem (how to simultaneously deal with numerous emerging environmental and other 
social priority issues) to a new mode of knowledge generation, assessment, and distri-
bution. 
ROLE OF ENVIRONMENT AS AN INDUCING FACTOR FOR CHANGE IN A WORLD 
CHARACTERIZED BY TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA 
At different levels (technologies, institutions, modes of production and consumption) 
development trajectories are characterized by path-dependent properties: inertia, persis-
tence, and "lock-in." The articles in this issue provide many examples in the domain of 
the energy sector, materials consumption, transportation systems, and so on. Different 
kinds of cumulative processes and positive feedbacks can lead to technological lock-in. 
This makes the representation of technological change a challenging task. But it is even 
a greater challenge for devising policies to redirect prevailing (environmentally unsustaina-
ble) growth trends and to escape technological and institutional lock-in. 
Nevertheless, environment criteria have the potential to change the direction of tech-
nical change and to stimulate technological breakthroughs in the design of new systems 
and the mechanisms through which the relative market shares of competing technolo-
gies evolve. 
One question addressed in this special issue is: under what conditions can society 
overcome technological inertia and lock-in to accelerate the transition toward new (but 
yet uncertain) technological and institutional configurations that are environmentally 
more compatible? These conditions can be explored at the theoretical level: Vernon Ruttan 
shows that the economics of path dependence and induced innovation theory could be 
mutually beneficially combined. They are two elements of a more general framework. 
Such conditions can also be explored at the empirical level, and the view put forward 
by most authors of this special issue on the possibilities of rapid changes in large sociotech-
nical systems is rather cautious (Robin Cowan and Staffan Hulten, Christopher Freeman, 
Jean-Marie Martin, and Iddo Wernick). Some of the postulated required changes ("decar-
bonization" of energy systems or "dematerialization" of materials use) may not entail 
an entirely new direction, but can build upon long-term evolutionary structural change 
trends. This view implies a more optimistic perspective, as it does not call for a radical 
departure from prevailing trends, rather it requires "only" a substantial acceleration of 
structural changes in a desirable direction (Arnulf Griibler and Nebosja Nakicenovic, 
and also Iddo Wernick). 
In summary, environmental criteria can play a role as inducing factors to create 
incentives for incremental improvements of existing systems. We know, however, that 
incremental improvements are not enough to achieve the energy and material consumption 
reductions that may be required to alleviate a number of potential environmental impacts. 
At present, it is not clear whether the environment along with other inducing factors is 
strong enough for a technology-led push toward a new "green" technoeconomic paradigm. 
There is, therefore, need for major policy support to trigger such changes. All the articles 
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in this special issue agree that such far-reaching transformations of sociotechnical systems 
cannot be implemented within a short time span . Instead, many decades (and for certain 
infrastructures perhaps even a century) will be required for a complete turnover of capital 
stock and an entire reconfiguration of the sociotechnical "landscape." The time scale of 
these sociotechnical changes matches those of some longer-term environmental issues, 
such as possible climate change. This places additional weight on new modes of informa-
tion generation and distribution of environmental issues because, by the time sufficient 
information is gathered to reduce both scientific uncertainty and the policy attention 
management problem, it may simply be too late to initiate, yet to implement, large-scale 
system transitions. 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY DILEMMAS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
At present it is impossible to develop a clear and concise picture of the policy implica-
tions of the above-presented, cross-cutting "meta"-themes of the interactions between 
technology and the environment. Therefore, we limit our discussion to describing four 
policy dilemmas; this discussion could serve as a guide for future research . These (some-
what overlapping) dilemmas are between: long-term and short-term environmental objec-
tives; trade-offs between technological innovation and environmental regulation; the di-
lemma between the need to maintain technological diversity and to promote cost 
reductions via standardization; and finally possible trade-offs between promoting technol-
ogy diffusion and maintaining desirable reversibility. 
The origin of the first dilemma arises from the fact that the goal of environmentally 
compatible development requires a wide range of complementary policies to support 
investments in new environmental technologies and the rapid diffusion of successful appli-
cations. Such policies essentially fall into two main areas: policies supporting the genera-
tion of long-term technological alternatives and policies to control pollution emissions 
in the short-term through norms, taxes, and end-of-pipe technologies. Thus, the dilemma 
deals with the fact that pursuing a short-term strategy of incremental improvements may 
generate counterinnovative effects, by reducing flexibility and incentives for undertaking 
technological experiments , ultimately delaying long-term radical changes . End-of-pipe 
technologies offer definite advantages to private firms because of their greater short-term 
adaptability in comparison with more radical (cleaner) process innovations; they can be 
added to existing plants ; and they generally involve fewer learning requirements than 
major process innovations [25). Under many conditions, they are a rational solution to the 
need to control pollution emissions from existing plants. As a result of these advantages, 
policies to encourage environmental innovation can unintentionally support the develop-
ment of solutions based on end-of-pipe technologies that may be inferior in the long-run 
in terms of both costs and environmental impacts to "green" plants designed from scratch. 
In this way, policies can have the effect of accelerating environmental progress in the 
short-term at the expense of more fundamental and drastic progress in the long-term. 
Thus, short-term environmental regulatory policies and policies designed to support major 
technological (and organizational) discontinuities may be contradictory. Strategies of 
end-of-pipe regulation-which can play a very significant role in short-term emission 
reduction - can undermine the bases and incentives for more radical changes in the 
long term. 
The second dilemma deals with the fact that environmental regulatory and standard 
policies can fundamentally alter the innovation behavior and performance of firms. This 
is due to two factors [19) . First, regulation creates a new risk in the R&D process (in 
addition to the technical and commercial risks). The risk is that a new product cannot 
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meet both current and future environmental standards. If there is uncertainty about the 
possibility that more severe restrictions may be imposed in the future, a firm may prefer to 
impose a moratorium on commercializing new process and product innovations. Second, 
political reluctance to impose costly measures on industry can lead to discrimination in 
the implementation of new regulatory standards. In most cases, new industrial facilities 
or consumer goods are subject to stronger regulations than existing ones. This "grandfa-
thering" principle turns out, in fact to be a punishment of innovators; it can introduce 
disincentives to allocate resources to R&D and investments. As a result, the conditions 
and procedures of innovation are changing in industries characterized by strong com-
mand-and-control environmental regulation. In particular, the conventional command-
and-control regulatory approach does not allow for flexibility to experiment with different 
approaches and technologies. This is not to say that command-and-control regulations 
are not necessary to establish high standards. It is to say that in most cases conventional 
command-and-control regulations preclude major paradigm shifts toward environmen-
tally preferable systems. 
The third dilemma is due to the tension between technological diversity and standard-
ization . Policy-makers (and society at large) typically find themselves in situations where 
they do not fully know the tasks ahead because most environmental issues (and possible 
remedies to them) are notoriously ill understood. This kind of uncertainty suggests a 
need to maintain technological diversity in order to maintain a broad range of alternatives, 
as well as to maintain flexibility as more is learned on a particular environmental issue. 
Maintaining diversity, however, is a very difficult task because of the constant tendency 
of technological systems to lose variety, e.g., in the quest for cost reductions through 
standardization, economies of scale, or shared infrastructures (network externalities). 
The last dilemma is between the needs to accelerate the creation and diffusion of 
environment friendly technologies and the needs to minimize technological irreversibility 
(in view of potential future "surprises"). When uncertainties about the merits and/or 
impacts of a technology are high, an attempt to redirect R&D to, or "forced" diffusion 
of, one of several options before a technology is adequately developed and tested could 
lead to failure [25]. Such policies could also prematurely narrow the range of solutions 
that might be willingly explored by private firms. When there is considerable uncertainty 
about the socially optimal course of technological development, the best policy is to 
refrain from active intervention and to identify and prepare to take advantage of the 
next opportunity window for high-leverage intervention. In this respect, policy-making 
must consider the opportunity costs of supporting any specific technology. 
There is, however, a class of technologies that requires support without any ambigu-
ity. These technologies are those classified as research tools, observation and exploration 
instruments, and decision-making tools ("meta-technologies"). These technologies in-
crease our capabilities of measurement, control, observation, learning, and decision-
making. Efforts to develop such technologies may, in fact, also benefit from the "recycling" 
of military technologies and environmentally relevant data. Examples include oceano-
graphic data collected by and for submarine operations, or the recent MEDEA proposal 
[26] to use high-resolution military spy satellites for long-term environmental monitoring. 
We need more technology, not less, was the credo of various authors writing about 
environmental problems in the 1970s. To this true proposition could be added that we need 
above all new modes of generation and distribution of knowledge, flexible regulations, 
technological diversity, as well as an increase of our observation and learning capabilities 
on environmental impacts of technologies . In our viewpoint, only new modes of techno-
logical learning, "meta-technologies" and new "technologies" of institutions and flexible 
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regulatory frameworks will enable us to better deal with the problems of ignorance, 
uncertainty, and the complexity of choices that are at stake for supporting the transition 
to environmental compatibility. 
Note Added in Proof 
This special issue of Technological Forecasting and Social Change aims to shed new 
light on the interactions between technology and the environment. For a complementary 
perspective, the reader is also referred to the recent special issue of D<Edalus [27] and 
its companion book Technological Trajectories and the Human Environment [28]. 
References 
I. Simon, H., Technology and Environment, Management Science B (Applications) XIX, (10), 1110-1121 
(1973). 
2. Rosenberg, N., Technology and Environment, in Perspectives on Technology . N. Rosenberg, ed ., Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge MA, 1976 
3. Ruttan, V., Technology and the Environment, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 53, 707-717 
(1971). 
4. Starr, C., and Rudman, R., Parameters of Technological Growth, Science 182 (October 26), 358-364 (1973). 
5. Forrester, J . W., World Dynamics, Wright-Allen, Cambridge, MA, 1971, p. 142. 
6. Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers J ., and Behrens, W.W., The Limits to Growth, Signet, New 
York, 1972, p. 207. 
7. Simon, J. L., and Kahn, H ., eds., The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 2000, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1984, p. 585 . 
8. Cole, H . S. D., Freeman, C., Jahoda, M., and Pavitt, K. L. R. , Models of Doom. Critique of Limits to 
Growth, Universe Books, New York, 1973, p. 244. 
9. Ausubel, J. H ., and Sladovich, H. E., eds ., Technology and Environment, National Academy Press, Wash-
ington, DC, 1989, p. 221. 
10. Gray, P. E., The Paradox of Technological Development, in Technology and Environment. J. H. Ausubel 
and H. E. Sladovich, eds., National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1989. 
11. Goeller, H. E., and Weinberg, A. M., The Age of Substitutability, or What Do We Do When the Mercury 
Runs Out, in Technological Substitution. Forecasting Techniques and Applications. H. A. Linstone and 
D. Saha!, eds., Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1976. 
12. Nakicenovic, N., Growth to Limits: Long Waves and the Dynamics of Technology, Thesis, IIASA, Laxen-
burg, Austria, 1984. 
13. Ausubel, J . H., Regularities in Technological Development: An Environmental View, in Technology and 
Environment. J. H. Ausubel and H. E. Sladovich, eds., National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1989. 
14. Martin, J .-M., Energy Intensity of Economic Activity in Industrialized Countries: Is the Long-term Evolution 
Providing Useful Information? Economies et Societes 4, 9-27 (1988) (in French) . 
15 . Gilli, P. V., Nakicenovic, N., Griibler, A., and Bodda, L., Technological Progress, Structural Change and 
Efficiency of Energy Use, Verbundgesellschaft, Vienna, 1990, p. 331 (in German). 
16. David, P . A., and Wright, G., Resource Abundance and American Economic Leadership, CEPR Publication 
No. 267, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1991. 
17. Freeman, C., and Perez, C., Structural Crises of Adjustment, Business Cycles and Investment Behavior, 
in Technical Change and Economic Theory . G . Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G . Silverberg, and L. Soete, 
eds., Pinter Publishers, London, 1988. 
18. Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J ., Beyond the Limits: Global Collapse ora Sustainable Future, 
Earthscan, London, 1993, p. 300. 
19. Eads, G., Regulation and Technical Change: Some Largely Unexplored Influences, American Economic 
Review (70)2, 51-54 (1980). 
20. Arthur, W. B., On Competing Technologies and Historical Small Events: The Dynamics of Choice under 
Increasing Returns, WP-83-90, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 1983. 
21. Arthur, W. B., Competing Technologies: An Overview, in Technical Change and Economic Theory . G. 
Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete, eds ., Pinter Publishers, London, 1988. 
22. Montroll, E.W., and Badger, W.W., Introduction to Quantitative Aspects of Social Phenomena, Gordon 
and Breach, New York, 1974, p. 349. 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 
23 . Brooks, H., The Typology of Surprises in Technology, Institutions and Development, in Sustainable Develop-
ment of the Biosphere. W. C. Clark and R. E. Munn, eds ., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 1986. 
24. Arrenhius, S., On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground, Philosophi-
cal Magazine and Journal of Science, Fifth Series, April, 237-276 (1896) . 
25. Soete, L., and Arundel, A., eds., The Long-Term Challenge: Environmentally Sustainable Development, 
in An Integrated Approach to European Innovation and Technology Diffusion Policy, Chap. 3. SPRINT, 
European Community Programme for Innovation and Technology Transfer, Brussels-Luxembourg, 1993. 
26. Beardsley, T ., Environmental Secrets-MEDEA Brings Intelligence in from the Cold, Scientific American, 
July, 19-20 (1995). 
27 . The Liberation of the Environment, Dcedalus 125(3), Summer (1996). 
28 . Ausubel, J. H . and Langford, H . D., eds ., Technological Trajectories and the Human Environment. National 
Academy Press, Washington, DC, (in press) . 
Received 21 March 1996; accepted 2 April 1996 

